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 Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 29 (May 28, 2020)1 
 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: FIDUCIARY EXCEPTION, COMMON-INTEREST 
EXCEPTION, SUBSTANTIAL-NEED EXCEPTION 
 
Summary 
This is an appeal from the district court’s order determining that certain documents, in 
whole and part, concerning a trust were not subject to attorney-client privilege under fiduciary and 
common-interest exceptions, nor were they subject to the work-product doctrine under the 
substantial-need exception. Plaintiffs sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the court from 
compelling the production of the disputed documents as well as a writ of mandamus to find the 
documents as undiscoverable and order their return or destruction. The Nevada Supreme Court 
reversed on all counts and established that no fiduciary exception that exists to attorney-client 
privilege in the state of Nevada; under Nevada law, only 5 exceptions exist to attorney-client 
privilege under NRS 49.115 and the Court declined to judicially create a sixth.2 
 
Background 
Scott Canarelli, a beneficiary of the Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust, initially 
began this suit against Lawrence Canarelli and Heidi Canarelli (Scott’s parents) who served as the 
family trustees as well as Frank Martin (Serving as a Special Administrator for the Estate of 
Edward Lubbers, an independent trustee), alleging that the trustees unlawfully withheld Trust 
distributions.  
A letter sent by Scott’s attorney in 2012 claimed that the trustees were demanding receipts 
from Scott’s purchases in a way that was per se bad faith and threatened to sue the trustees. After 
the letter was received, Lubbers listed “Scott - Lawsuit threatened” on one of the business entities’ 
meeting agendas. In 2013, Scott’s parents resigned from their roles, leaving Lubbers as the 
successor family trustee and he quickly entered into a purchase agreement exceeding $25 million 
to sell off the Trust’s ownership in Lawrence and Heidi’s business entities. In response, Scott filed 
a petition requesting the court to compel Lubber to provide all information related to the agreement 
as well as an inventory and accounting for the Trust. Lubbers retained two attorneys after this and 
communicated with them via phone and email multiple times over the course of the litigation, 
including a phone call on October 14, which included a discussion on “responses to petition” just 
two days before a response was filed. Scott also filed a supplemental petition asserting breach of 
fiduciary duty against all three of the original trustees. 
There are two groups of disputed documents in this case. The first were inadvertently 
disclosed during discovery and contained Lubbers’ notes on the October 14th call, one document 
of notes in preparation for it and the other taken contemporaneously during it. The attorneys on 
the call confirmed in declarations that discussion on potential responses did, in fact occur, and that 
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2  NEV. REV. STAT. §49.115 (2020). 
 Lubbers also discussed other related matters including possible defense strategies. The second 
group of documents disputed contain Lubbers’ notes taken during a December 19th meeting with 
the other trustees, counsel, Scott, and an independent trust appraiser. 
Scott moved for a determination of privilege, with the discovery commissioner finding that 
each of the disputed documents contained Lubbers’ notes and eventually ruling that a portion of 
the Group 1 documents were protected by attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, 
but that other portions were discoverable. Those parts containing factual statements or information 
unrelated to the trust were not protected and it was said that to the extent these statements dealt 
with the privileged communications or work product, they were, nonetheless, still discoverable 
under fiduciary and common interest exceptions to attorney-client privilege as well as the 
substantial need exception to the work-product doctrine. The Group 2 documents were also 
deemed discoverable under the substantial need exception. The district court adopted most of these 
findings, with just a slight dispute as to the Group 1 documents (deeming a document that the 
commissioner felt was discoverable in its entirety to only have a portion that was discoverable). 
As a result, petitioners filed for a writ of prohibition to prevent the court from compelling the 
production of the disputed documents and a writ of mandamus to find them as undiscoverable and 
order their return or destruction. 
 
Discussion 
The Group 1 Documents are Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege 
The Court first decides that attorney-client privilege is indeed applicable to the Group 1 
documents, as long as the content of the notes was previously or is subsequently communicated 
between a client and their attorney, the notes will be communications subject to attorney-client 
privilege even if they are not physically delivered. It then determines that the district court abused 
its discretion when it found that petitioners did not prove that the notes were communicated to 
counsel, as supported by billing records and declarations by Lubbers’ lawyers indicating that the 
Oct. 14th call contained discussions surrounding Scott’s petitions. The Court also held that an 
abuse of discretion occurred in regard to finding that the factual information contained in the Group 
1 documents was not subject to attorney-client privilege. While the documents contained factual 
information, facts communicated to obtain legal advice are still protected by the privilege; the 
information in the Group 1 documents was relayed in order to obtain legal advice and, therefore, 
fell under attorney client privilege. 
 While Scott argued that these documents, despite being subject to attorney-client privilege, 
were still discoverable under the fiduciary exception and common-interest exception, the Court 
rejected both of these arguments. In other states, the fiduciary exception provides that a fiduciary, 
such as a trustee, is unable to assert attorney-client privilege against beneficiaries on matters of 
trust administration. Nevada, however, does not include the exception in NRS 49.115, where it 
expressly lists the 5 exceptions recognized in the state to attorney-client privilege and the Court 
chooses to defer to the decision of the state to no include such an exception in the statute.3 The 
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 common-interest exception is, in fact, one of the 5 statutory exceptions, but the Court denies its 
applicability in this instance. The exception is limited by 49.115(5) when an attorney is retained 
or consulted in common and the communication is relevant to a matter of common interest.4 In 
this case the attorneys were not retained or consulted in common and an attorney representing a 
trustee as a fiduciary does not result in an attorney-client relationship between the attorney and the 
beneficiary. This is further bolstered by the fact that Lubbers’ communications with his attorneys 
were not relevant to a matter of common interest, as he was in fact adverse to Scott at the time 
when he communicated with them and did so for his own protection rather than a matter of 
common interest. 
 
The Group 2 documents are protected by the work-product doctrine 
 The work product doctrine prevents a party from discovering documents that can be fairly 
said to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for another party.5 For protected work 
product to be discoverable, the party must show a substantial need for the materials in its case and 
that it can’t without undue hardship obtain their substantial equivalent any other way; the party 
seeking the discovery must bear the burden and just an assertion of the need will not be enough. 
The Court finds that the lower court abused its discretion in finding the Group 2 documents 
unprotected as the Group 2 documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation, thus falling under 
the work-product doctrine, and because Scott was at the meeting and could also depose other 
attendees for anything that he may have missed, he does not have a substantial need for the Group 
2 documents. 
 
Conclusion 
Most notably in this case, the Court declared the fiduciary exception to attorney-client 
privilege to not exist in the state of Nevada under current law. It also found the lower court to have 
abused its discretion in declaring both groups of documents to have not been protected, with the 
Court instead deeming them as undiscoverable. The petition for prohibition is granted, prohibiting 
the district court from compelling or allowing the production of the disputed documents. 
 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.115(5) (2020). 
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